The Future Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Program: A Done Deal?

by Benjamin Cook

Sarcastosaurus Feb 11

READ IN APP

The more it is publicly denied, the more it seems real

At this point, Ukraine's pursuit of nuclear weapons is not just possible—it is likely. The only question is when, not if. Provided the Ukrainian President Zelensky discontinues his practice of amateurish discussion of nuclear weapons with journalists in the public - it will not be a publicized program, nor will it be openly discussed beyond suggestive statements and strategic ambiguity.

But, this author is sure: one should make no mistake; in the long term Ukraine will develop a nuclear arsenal. Once the war is over, expect a policy similar to that of Israel—Ukraine will neither confirm nor deny the existence of a nuclear deterrent. During the war itself, Kyiv will continue to publicly deny any such program while privately ensuring that it is an option.

From a strategic standpoint, it only makes sense. If international agreements had any real power, Ukraine would not be at war today. The Budapest Memorandum—where Ukraine gave up the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world in exchange for security assurances—proved meaningless. Ukraine now understands the lesson that North Korea, India, and Pakistan understood long ago: nuclear weapons are the only real guarantee of security against existential threats.

The Simplest Path: Plutonium from Spent Fuel

Ukraine already has one of the hardest-to-acquire resources for nuclear weapons: fissile material. The country operates multiple nuclear reactors, meaning it has access to spent nuclear fuel containing plutonium.

Plutonium extraction is not a new science. The PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction) process was developed decades ago and is well-documented. Any nation with nuclear scientists—Ukraine included—can theoretically extract weapons-grade plutonium from reactor waste. If Ukraine is serious about building a deterrent, this is their most direct path.

Some may argue that Ukraine lacks reprocessing facilities, but that is an outdated assumption. Modern chemical processing can be done with relatively limited infrastructure compared to Cold War-era facilities. Additionally, Ukraine’s Western allies, including countries that already possess nuclear weapons, may be willing to quietly assist in this regard—whether through technology transfer, intelligence, or overlooked "leaks" of necessary materials.

Ukraine Doesn’t Need Centrifuges to Enrich Uranium

Much of the world thinks that centrifuge technology is required to enrich uranium into weapons-grade U-235. That is simply not true. Before gas centrifuges became the dominant method, multiple other enrichment methods existed—diffusion, laser isotope separation, and electromagnetic separation (used in the Manhattan Project). While less efficient, these methods still work and can be pursued if needed.

The reason countries prefer centrifuges is because they make enrichment faster and allow the production of larger quantities of weapons-grade material. But Ukraine does not need to mass-produce bombs. Even one or two weapons are enough for deterrence.

The Dirty Secret: Missing and Unaccounted-for Nuclear Material

The easiest way for Ukraine to acquire weapons-grade material is not to enrich it but to receive it—or simply be allowed to “find” it.

There is a nonzero chance that this has already happened or will happen. Ukraine has well-connected allies, and some of those allies have access to nuclear material that is either deliberately provided or simply left unguarded for Ukraine to acquire.

Let’s be blunt: Russian nuclear security is not perfect. The fall of the Soviet Union led to unaccounted-for warheads and weapons-grade materials. Some of these could, in theory, already be in Ukrainian hands. The US also has missing nuclear material. And if the US and Russia do, what about France, the UK, Pakistan, India, or China? What about non-state actors?

Western governments will not publicly hand Ukraine nuclear weapons. But they do not have to. If Ukraine were to "recover" a misplaced Soviet warhead or nuclear material from a compromised facility, plausible deniability would be maintained. And if this were to happen, the international community would turn a blind eye.

The 1940s Tech Factor: Nuclear Weapons Are Not a Technological Challenge

There is a popular misconception that nuclear weapons require cutting-edge technology. They don’t. The first nuclear bomb was built in 1945 using 1940s technology. Ukraine is a modern, industrialized country with an advanced scientific base. A determined nation-state like Ukraine could build a basic nuclear device relatively quickly if it had the right materials.

A crude nuclear bomb doesn’t have to be sophisticated. A gun-type uranium bomb like the one dropped on Hiroshima requires very little advanced engineering. The challenge is acquiring fissile material—not designing the bomb itself. Even an improvised, inefficient bomb would be enough for deterrence.

What If Ukraine Already Has a Bomb?

If Ukraine only needed a crude nuclear device—one with an unpredictable yield—it could theoretically already have one. How? By using nuclear material derived from spent fuel.

Consider the implications: If Ukraine has already developed a basic nuclear capability, they may not use it in the traditional sense but as a last-resort deterrent. If Russia were to escalate to a full-scale, catastrophic attack, Ukraine might respond by making it clear that it has an untraceable nuclear capability. The mere belief that Ukraine has a bomb could influence Russian strategic calculations.

Could Ukraine Already Have a Crude Nuclear Weapon Inside Russia?

Given Russia’s vast and often poorly controlled borders, there is a plausible scenario in which Ukraine has already smuggled a crude nuclear device into Russian territory. Is this a Tom Clancy novel, or just low hanging fruit for Ukrainian special services? The easiest routes for such an operation would be through Belarus or by sea.

Belarus serves as a convenient transit point due to its porous border and pro-Russian but internally corrupt security forces. Smuggling operations, even for high-value goods, are common in this region. A small, concealed nuclear device—one capable of being transported via truck or shipping container—could have entered Russia months ago.

Similarly, the maritime route offers opportunities. Russia has extensive coastal borders and a vast network of shipping operations, many of which rely on corrupt or poorly monitored customs procedures. A nuclear device could theoretically have been shipped from anywhere in the world, disguised as industrial cargo.

The implication of such a possibility is enormous: Russia’s leadership cannot be certain that they do not already have an existential threat within their own borders. If Ukraine possesses such a device, it may never need to use it—merely the fear that it exists could serve as a deterrent.

Conclusion: Ukraine’s Nuclear Path Is a Matter of When, Not If

Ukraine’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not a theoretical debate—it is an eventual reality. The combination of available fissile material, scientific expertise, and existential necessity makes it inevitable. Ukraine understands that international agreements mean nothing in the face of brute force. The West may not officially support Ukraine’s nuclear ambitions, but there are ways to ensure they look the other way.

If Ukraine does not develop a nuclear deterrent, it will remain at the mercy of Russia’s military might. Kyiv knows this. The world should prepare for a future where Ukraine, much like Israel, becomes a silent nuclear power.

If you want to creep yourself out and see just how “easy” it is to take nuclear waste and turn it into weapons grade material… read this: https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/docs/NMHB2020rev_Ch15.pdf

If you’ve made it this far you have definitely gained some valuable insights from my research. I hope you either make a one time contribution to my research, a “tip” if you will, or join my Substack as a paid member. Your support means everything to my research.

Benjamin Cook
https://buymeacoffee.com/researchukraine